LEGAL NOTES.
This branch of the subject received attention in a note to Lynch v. Fallon
(1876), and Bollinanv. Loomis (1874), reported in full in 16 AmERICAN
LAW REGISTER 331, and 1S Id. 75; s. c., ii R. I. 311, and 41 Conn. 58Y.
Other cases are collected and reviewed in 26 Id. 562.
The broker is not put to the trouble of obtaining definite terms between the seller and buyer. See Veazie v. Parker(1881), 72 Me. 443; abstracted in 21 AmERICAN LAW REGISTER 69, and leading article in 26 Id.
565The broker's duty of faithfulness to his employer was upheld in Young
v. Hughes (i88o), 32 N. J. Eq. 372, and Hughes v. Young (1879), 3r Id.
6o; abstracted in 19 AMERICAT LAW REGISTER 582, and I8 Id. 788.
J. B. U.
Other cases are considered in 26 Id. 564.

LEGAL NOTES.
STATE RimEPUDITION.-It seems to me that the problem referred to by
A Jurist (ante, page I5) is extremely simple. A State cannot impair the
obligations of a contract: a State cannot be sued. These two-somewhat
antagonistic rules, work the apparent contradiction in which A Jurist
seems to think the Court has fallen. But while it is an anomaly in municipal law to start with creating a rule, and at the same time withdraw all
power to enforce it, in this particular case we have not done this; we
have laid down a very wise, universal rule, and prohibited a particular
mode of enforcing it. Nor is there wanting analogy in the law for
private persons. A contract after six years is no ground for a suit, or
rather the debtor is suable or not at his mere option. Is the contract
obliterated? Certainly not. It remains for every possible purpose, saving that of being enforced by a suit against the contractor. It sustains a
pledge, for example. Remove the obstacle of the statutory prohibition,
and the contract has the same force as it had on the day of the breach:
and this may be done by the State or by the party.
Precisely analagous, but with much greater scope, is the effect of the
rules in respect of contracts with the State. The State is as powerless to
destroy the contract or to take from it any incident as is a private person
or corporation. It differs not from many persons in freedom from compulsion in respect to its contracts (married women at common law,
infants, ambassadors, and probably others), but the contracts remain.
But is capacity to compel performance, the only incident of contract? Is
not freedom from duty otherwise compulsory, an important thing? Is
not the right to discharge an obligation important? Is not the power to
enforce a right as against all men, even though agents of the State, important ; even though the State cannot be made a defendant or its property taken in execution? All these incidents of a contract remain and
can be inferred, and cannot be limited or restricted by the State. Possibly
the framers of the Constitution had not in their minds the humiliating
-conception of a State inducing the citizen to pay his money, and then
destroying his right to the thing purchased, If it was in the form of an
executory obligation of the State. They certainly contemplated bring-
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ing the State to book; but this was a little too high a flight for even the
days of purity and unselfish patriotism, and was promptly withdrawn.
The real difficulty in the problem, however, is not logical; it lies in the
absurdity of applying to the things we call States, a pr rogative that is
essential to a State in the proper sense of that word. To endow a municipality with this prerogative, is manifestly absurd. What element is there
in a State of the American Union that, distinguishing it from a municipality, demands exemption from compulsion to be honest and true?
which exemption is onlyjustified by the duty which is higher than the
duty to perform promises; that is, the duty to preserve the Nation, and
that is removed from the States to the imperial power of the central government.
A STUDENT IN POLITICS.
CONTEMPT OF CouRis the subject of a new Statute in California, approved by Governor Markham, February I7th instant. . Themostimportant section will be seen to be the twelfth subdivision. The bill was caused
.y the imprisonment of Mr. Barry, of the San Francisco Star, for reflecting upon one of the Superior Judges of that city. It is well that such
power is taken away, for it ought never to be exercised by the Judiciary.
The full text of the bill is furnished by the Alta, as follows:
"SECTIoN I. Section 1209 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California
is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
"Section i2o9. The followingactsor omissions, in respectto acourtof
justice, or proceedings therein, are contempts of the authority ofthe court:
"I.
Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge
while holding court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other
judicial proceeding.
"2. A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct, or violent disturbance,
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.
"3. Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty
by an attorney, counsel, clerk Sheriff, Coroner, or other person appointed
or elected to perform ajudicial or ministerial service.
"4. Deceit or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court by a
party to an action or special proceeding.
"5. Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the
court.
"6. Assuming to be an officer, attorney, counsel of a court, and actingas such without authority.'
"7. Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by
virtue of an order or process of such court.
"8. Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going
to, remaining at, or returning from the court where the action is.
on the
calendar for trial.
"9. Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings
of a court.
"io.
Disobedience of a subpcena duly served, or refusing to be sworn
or answer as a witness.
" iI. When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or
serve as such, or improperly conversing with a party to an action to be

